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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-106. Sum Certain
(1) The sum payable is a sum certain even though it is to be paid
(e) with costs of collection or an attorney's fee or both upon de-
fault.
(2) Nothing in this section shall validate any term which is otherwise
illegal.
ANNOTATION
*FIRST SAV. AND LOAN ASS'N V. HELDMAN
79 N.J. Super. 65, 190 A.2d 400 (1963)
Heldman was indebted to First Savings on an installment promissory
note which contained a provision calling for the payment of reasonable at-
torney's fees in the event of collection by law or through an attorney. In the
subsequent attachment suit, the trial court entered a default judgment in
favor of First Savings for the amount owing and attorney's fees, holding that
under New Jersey case law, even if no statute authorized such a clause, it was
valid so long as no rule of court forbade it. Section 3-106(2), it went on to
say, "leaves local law unchanged."
S.L.P.
SECTION 3-116. Instruments Payable to Two or
More Persons
An instrument payable to the order of two or more persons
(b) if not in the alternative is payable to all of them and may be
negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of them.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
HOWARD V. ZILCH
— Mass. —, 190 N.E.2d 77 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-413(2), infra.
SECTION 3-303. Taking for Value
A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed
or that he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instru-
ment otherwise than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an
antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim
is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an ir-
revocable commitment to a third person.
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
UNITED REFRIGERATOR CO. V. APPLEBAUM
410 Pa. 210, 189 A.2d 253 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-415(5), infra.
SECTION 3-306. Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the
instrument subject to
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-perform-
ance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a
special purpose (Section 3-408); and
ANNOTATION
*NEBOSHEK V. BERZANI
-III.-, 191 N.E.2d 411 (1963)
In 1961, the holder of a promissory note allegedly executed by the de-
fendant obtained a judgment by confession. The judgment was subsequently
opened to permit the defendant to file an answer and a bill of particulars in
which he alleged a number of defenses including fraud in the procurement,
want of consideration, and non-delivery of the note. Counsel for the holder
agreed to a postponement of the hearing on the holder's motion to confirm the
judgment because of the inability of the maker's attorney to be present, but
the trial judge denied postponement and found for the holder by default.
Upon appeal, the court reversed and remanded the case for retrial, hold-
ing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the postponement. The
court compared the applicable sections of the controlling Negotiable Instru-
ments Law with Sections 3-401, 3-306(c) and 3-408 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and concluded that under both statutes "practically the same
rule with reference to execution and delivery was in effect." Since the de-
fendant's pleadings were verified, the presumption of a valid delivery as
provided by Section 16 of the NIL was destroyed, and the holder therefore
had the immediate burden of proving delivery of the note or that he was a
holder in due course.
S.L.P.
SECTION 3-401. Signature
(1) No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears
thereon.
(2) A signature is made by use of any name, including any trade or
assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used in lieu of
a written signature.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*NEBOSHEK V. BERZANI
-III.-, 191 N.E.2d 411 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-306(c), supra.
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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SECTION 3-403. Signature by Authorized Representative
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and
his authority to make it may be established as in other cases of representa-
tion. No particular form of appointment is necessary to establish such
authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an in-
strument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the per-
son represented nor shows that the representative signed in a
representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties,
is personally obligated if the instrument names the person repre-
sented but does not show that the representative signed in a
representative capacity, or if the instrument does not name the
person represented but does show that the representative signed
in a representative capacity.
(3) Except as otherwise established, the name of an organization pre-
ceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized individual is a
signature made in a representative capacity.
ANNOTATION
IN THE MATTER OF LASKIN
316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963), reversing 204 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
The facts of this case may be found in an annotation in 4 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 108 & B.C. U.C.C. Co-Ord. 176. The court, on appeal, reversed,
basing its reversal on the lower court's incorrect application of the Uniform
Commercial Code rather than applying principles of bankruptcy. A complete
discussion and analyzation of this case will be contained in a note to be in-
cluded in the Winter, 1964 issue of the Review, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
No. 2 (1964).
ANNOTATION
UNIVERSAL LIGHTNING ROD, INC. V. RISCHALL ELEC. CO .
24 Conn. Sup. 399, 192 A.2d 50 (1963)
Harold Rischall signed a promissory note in the amount of $590 payable
to Universal Lightning Rod in the following manner: "Rischall Electric Com-
pany, Inc., [and under this designation] Harold M. Rischall." The word
"we" was used with the promissory language of the note and the note had
been prepared at the direction of Rischall. An action was brought by Uni-
versal against Rischall seeking to hold him personally liable on the promissory
note.
The court held that under Section 3-403 Rischall was personally liable
since he signed the note without indicating any representative capacity and
had offered no evidence sufficient to prove otherwise. Judgment in the amount
of the note plus a reasonable attorney's fee was entered for Universal.
B.M.H.
166
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
SECTION 3-408. Consideration
Want or failure of consideration is a defense as against any person
not having the rights of a holder in due course (Section 3-305), except that
no consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation thereon
given in payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation of any
kind. Nothing in this section shall be taken to displace any statute outside
this Act under which a promise is enforceable notwithstanding lack or failure
of consideration. Partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto
whether or not the failure is in an ascertained or liquidated amount.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*NEBOSHEK V. BERZANI
- III. —, 191 N.E.2d 411 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-306(c), supra.
SECTION 3-413. Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor
(2) The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any
necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft
to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up. The drawer may disclaim
this liability by drawing without recourse.
ANNOTATION
HOWARD V. ZILCH
— Mass. —, 190 N.E.2d 77 (1963)
Howard, an accommodation maker on a note payable by Zilch to a bank,
paid the bank the balance of the note after Zilch's bankruptcy. During the
bankruptcy proceedings and after his discharge, Zilch made oral promises to -
Howard that he would reimburse him for all payments which he had made
on the defaulted note. Later, Zilch orally directed his attorney to draw a check
upon funds due Zilch from a tort action for the amount which Howard had
paid on the defaulted note. The check was made payable to both Howard and
Zilch and was endorsed by the latter who delivered it to Howard. The follow-
ing day, pursuant to Zilch's orders, the attorney stopped payment on the
check and so notified Howard. In an action to recover the amount of the
check, Howard, as holder of the check, claimed that the check was a valid
written promise to pay on demand the amount stated to meet the requirethents
of c. 259 § 3 of Mass. Gen. Laws which provides: that a promise to pay a debt
discharged in bankruptcy must be contained in some writing signed by the
debtor or by some other person authorized by him. On appeal, the court re-
versed and entered judgment for Howard, holding that the attorney's signature
on the check was a promise, as provided in Section 3-413, and thereby met the
requirements of the statute.
COMMENT
There should have been no question as to whether the check was a writing
sufficient to memorialize the agreement. However, there were other important
* Code construed but did not govern the case..
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questions which the court did not decide. Instead of suing on the contract,
could Howard have sued Zilch on the endorsement of the check? Section 3-802
allows the holder of a dishonored check to maintain an action based either on
the underlying obligation or, in the alternative, on the instrument. However,
the relationship between Howard and Zilch was not as holder and endorser, but
as joint payees on the same check. Because of this, it would not be possible
to hold Zilch liable on the instrument; but could Howard recover from the
drawer, attorney? Although theoretically it may be possible, the practical con-
siderations would make it improbable because Section 3-116 only allows such
a check to be enforced if both payees join in the action as parties plaintiff.
Thus, the action was upon an oral promise evidenced by the check for statute
of frauds purposes but not on the instrument itself.
SECTION 3-415. Contract of Accommodation Party
(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated,
and if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the instrument
against such party.
ANNOTATION
UNITED REFRIGERATOR CO. V. APPLEBAUM
410 Pa. 210, 189 A.2d 253 (1963)
Several checks were issued to a named payee signed in the name of a
corporate drawer by its officers. The officers also endorsed the checks as in-
dividuals. The drawee dishonored the checks for insufficient funds. Upon the
officers' refusal to pay the checks after proper demand and notice, the payee
brought an action against the endorsers as individuals. The officers alleged in
their answer that they had endorsed the checks solely as accommodation en-
dorsers for the payee, they received no consideration and they therefore were
not liable to the payee. Payee appealed from the denial of its motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
In affirming, the court held that a trial was necessary to determine whom
the endorsers accommodated since, under Section 3-415(5), if the payee is
found to be the party accommodated, the endorsers, as accommodation parties,
would not be liable to the payee on the checks.
COMMENT
In a footnote, the court properly expressed confusion over plaintiff's al-
legation of consideration and defendant's denial of receipt of "any value or
consideration." An accommodation party is liable to a holder for value under
Section 3 -415(1) even though he received nothing himself for the obligation.
Conceptually, the consideration which went to the party accommodated sup-
ports the promise of the accommodation party. However, if the holder had in
fact given nothing for the instrument to the party from whom he took it (no
value as defined in Sections 3-303 and 1-201(44)), an accommodation party
would not be liable. Thus, if the drawer was in fact the party accommodated
in the above case and the payee had given him nothing in the way of value,
defendants would have an additional defense. The parties had certainly not
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made this distinction in framing their pleadings if, indeed, such a distinction
had been intended.
B.M.H.
SECTION 3-802. Effect of Instrument on Obligation for
Which It Is Given
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an un-
derlying obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer,
maker or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse
on the instrument against the underlying obligor; and
(b) in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto until
the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand until its
presentment. If the instrument is dishonored action may be
maintained on either the instrument or the obligation; dis-
charge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also dis-
charges him on the obligation.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
HOWARD V. ZILCH
— Mass. —, 190 N.E.2d 77 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 3-413(2), supra.
ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES
SECTION 8-317. Attachment or Levy Upon Security
(1) No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other
interest evidenced thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the
security is actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy
but a security which has been surrendered to the issuer may be attached
or levied upon at the source.
(2) A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a security shall be en-
titled to such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or
otherwise, in reaching such security or in satisfying the claim by means
thereof as is allowed at law or in equity in regard to property which
cannot readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal process.
ANNOTATION
UNITED STATES V. BRODY
213 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 1963)
Prior to the commencement of an action by the United States against a
delinquent taxpayer and his insurer to foreclose tax liens on the taxpayer's
life insurance policies, the United States served upon the insurer a notice of
levy on all of the taxpayer's property in the insurer's possession. Two endow-
ment policies issued to the taxpayer provided that at their maturity, insurer
would pay the taxpayer the face value of the policies upon demand and sur-
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